atha tṛtīyo ‘dhyāyaḥ – karma-yogaḥ

The two aspects of wisdom – relating respectively to Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti, i.e., to the Path of Works and the Path of Renunciation – with which the Gita-śastra is concerned have been pointed out by the Lord in the Second Discourse, speaking of them as wisdom concerning Sankhya and wisdom concerning Yoga.

From 2.55 to the end of the Discourse, He has recommended renunciation of action to those who hold to the Sankhya-buddhi (Sankhya aspect of wisdom) and has added in 2.72 that their end can be achieved by being devoted to that alone.

And as to Arjuna, He has declared in 2. 47 that he should resort to works (karma) alone as based on Yoga-buddhi (the Yoga aspect of wisdom), while it has not been said that the Highest Good can be attained by that alone.

Seeing this, Arjuna is troubled in mind and therefore puts a question to the Lord. (3.1-2). This perplexity in Arjuna’s mind is quite explicable. He thinks, „how might the Lord first describe to me – a devout seeker of Bliss – the direct means of attaining Bliss, namely adherence to the Sankhya aspect of wisdom, and then command me to do action which is fraught with many a tangible evil and which is but an indirect and uncertain means of attaining Bliss?

Arjuna’s question, too points to this state of mind; and the Lord’s words in reply to the question are explicable only when the śastra makes such a distinction (between Sankhya and Yoga) as has been described above.

No conjunction of Knowledge and Action.
A certain commentator interprets the meaning of Arjuna’s question differently and explains the Lord’s reply as opposed (to the question) in meaning. So also, he sums up the teaching of the Gita-śastra in one way in the introductory portion of his commentary, while he interprets the question and answer in this connection in a different way.

How ? It is stated in the introduction that a simultaneous conjunction of knowledge and action for men in all stages of religious life is inculcated ‚in the Gita-śastra; and moreover a specific statement is made amounting to an emphatic denial of the doctrine that moksha can be attained by knowledge alone, i.e., without those works which are enjoined by the scriptures as obligatory throughout life.

But here, in the Third Discourse, he makes out that devotion to only one of the two paths is taught. This is tantamount to saying that the very works which are enjoined by the scriptures as obligatory throughout life have to be renounced.

How is it possible either for the Lord to teach such contradictions or for the disciple to accept them?

That commentator may perhaps explain away the contradiction thus : It is only to the gṛhasthas (to the order of married house-holders) – but not to other orders – that salvation by mere knowledge, preceded by the renunciation of works enjoined in the sruti and in the smṛti, is denied. This, too, involves a self-contradiction. For, after declaring (in the introduction) that a simultaneous conjunction of knowledge and action is meant for all religious orders by the Gīta-śastra, how could he, in contradiction thereto, say here (in 3. Discourse) that salvation by mere knowledge is meant for some religious orders?

Then the commentator may explain away the contradiction thus: It is with reference to the srauta-karma (action enjoined in the sruti) that the assertion is made that salvation by mere – i.e., unconjoined with the śrautakarma – knowledge is denied to the gṛihasthas. The smarta-karma (action enjoined in tlie smriti) that is meant for a gṛhastha is ignored as if it were absent. It is in this sense that salvation by mere knowledge is denied in the case of gṛhasthas.

This also involves an absurdity. For, how is it possible for any intelligent man to believe that salvation by knowledge conjoined only with the smarta-karma is denied to a gṛhastha alone, but not to other orders?

On the other hand, if, as a means of obtaining salvation, the smarta-karma should be conjoined with knowledge in the case of the sanyasins – the fourth religious order – then it follows that, for the gnhasthas also, knowledge should be conjoined only with the smarta-karma, not with the śrauta-karma.

Then, he may explain away the contradiction thus: it is only in the case of a grihastha that a conjunction (of knowledge) with both the śrauta-karma and, the smarta-karma – both being of equal importance to him – is necessary for salvation, whereas the samnyasins can attain moksha by knowledge conjoined with the smarta-karma only. If so, too much exertion in the shape of both the śrauta-karma and the smarta-karma, very painful in themselves, falls to the lot of the gṛhastha.

Renunciation enjoined in the scriptures.
The commentator in question may now say : Because of this multiplicity of exertion, salvation is attained only by a gṛhastha, but not by other religious orders who have not to do the nitya or obligatory śrauta-karma. This, too, is wrong; for, in all the Upanishads, in the Itihasas, in the Purtvia, and in the Yoga-śastra, renunciation of all karma is enjoined on the seeker of moksha as an accessory to knowledge. Both in the śruti and in the smnti, a gradual passage (through the three orders to the fourth order) is enjoined, as well as a sudden jump (from any one of the three to the fourth order).

If so – the commentator in question may retort – it follows that a conjunction of knowledge with action is necessary for all religious orders. No, (we reply). For, renunciation of all action is enjoined on the seeker of moksha, as the following passages from the śruti sho:
„Having given up all desire for progeny, for wealth, and for the world, they lead a mendicant life.”(Bri. 3-5-I-),
„Wherefore, of these austerities, renunciation, they say, is excellent.” „Renunciation alone excelled.” (Taittiriya-Up. 4-79,78).
„Not by action, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation, some attained immortality.” (Ibid.2-12).
„One may renounce the world when yet a student.” ( Jabala-Upanishad, 4).

The following passages from the smriti may also be quoted : – „Give up religion, give up irreligion. Give up truth, give up untruth. Having given up both truth and untruth, give up that § by which you give them up.” „Finding the samsara (mundane existence) worthless and wishing to get at the essence, the unmarried grow quite weary of life and renounce the world. ” – (Brihaspati).

Suka’s teaching runs as follows :
„By action a person is bound, and by wisdom he is released. Therefore, the sages who see the goal do no action.” (MBh 12.233.7)
Here (in the Bhagavad-gitu) also we have, „Renouncing all actions by thought.” (5.12).

Moksha cannot be the effect of an action.
Moksha, too, being no effect of an act, no action will avail a mumukshu, a seeker of moksha. {Objection):The performance of obligatory duties is intended for the mere avoidance of the sin (of their omission).

(Answer): No. For, the sin arises only in the case of one who has not formally entered the fourth order, the order of samnyasins. It is certainly (as the opponent must admit) not possible to imagine that a samnyasin will incur sin by omitting the agni-karya – worship of the sacred fire – as students (Bralimacharins) do thereby incur when they are not yet samnyasins, i.e., when they have not formally renounced works.

Neither is it, indeed, possible to imagine the generation of sin – which is a bhava or positive effect – out of the omission of the obligatory duties – which is an abhava or mere negation; for, that the generation of existence out of non-existence is impossible is taught by the sruti in the words „How can existence arise out of non-existence?” [Chhdndogya-Upanishad , 6-2).

If the Veda should teach what is inconceivable to us, viz., that evil arises from the omission of prescribed duties, it is tantamount to saying that the Veda conduces to no good and is therefore no authority; for, performance and non-performance alike would only produce pain.

This would further lead to the absurd conclusion that śastra or revelation is creative, not indicative, a conclusion which is acceptable to none. Hence no karma for samnyasins; and hence also the absurdity of a conjunction of knowledge and action.

Conjunction is inconsistent with Arjuna’s question.
Arjuna’s question (in 3.1) would also be inexplicable. If, in the Second Discourse, it was said by the Lord that both knowledge and action should be simultaneously conjoined in Arjuna himself, then his question in 3.1 cannot be explained.

If it was taught to Arjuna that both knowledge and action should be conjoined in him, knowledge which is superior to action must certainly have been meant for him. Then there could be no occasion for the question, or the blame, which is implied in Arjuna’s words „then why dost Thou, O Keśava, direct me to this terrible action? ” (3.1)

It can by no means be supposed that knowledge, the superior of the two, was forbidden to Arjuna alone by the Lord in His previous teaching, – in which case the question on the part of Arjuna distinguishing (one path from the other might arise).

If, on the other hand, it has been previously taught by the Lord that knowledge and action are intended for two distinct classes of men respectively, on the ground that a simultaneous devotion – on the part of one man – to knowledge and action was impossible owing to their mutual opposition, then the question (in 3.1) becomes explicable.

Even supposing that the question was asked from ignorance, the Lord’s answer that devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are assigned to two distinct classes of men cannot be explained. Neither can the reply of the Lord be attributed to His ignorance.

From this very answer of the Lord – that devotion to knowledge and devotion to action are assigned to distinct classes of persons – follows the impossibility of a conjunction of knowledge and action.

Wherefore the conclusion of the Gita and of all the Upanishads is this, that moksha can be obtained by knowledge alone, unaided (by action).

If a conjunction of the two were possible (for one man), Arjuna’s request to the Lord to teach him only one of the two, jñāna or karma, would be unaccountable.