BhG 2.21

The enlightened man has to renounce works.
Having started (in 2.19) the proposition that the Self is neither the agent nor the object of the action of slaying, and having stated in the next verse the immutability of the Self as the reason for that statement, the Lord concludes the proposition as follows; –

Whoso knows Him as indestructible, eternal, unborn and inexhaustible, –
How, O son of Pritha, and whom, does such a man cause to slay, and whom does he slay?

He who knows the Self (described in the last verse) as indestructible, i.e., devoid of the final change called death, as eternal, i.e., devoid of change called transformation, as unborn and inexhaustible, i.e., devoid of birth and decline, –

how does an enlightened man of this description do the act of slaying, or how does he cause another to slay? He slays nobody at all, nor does he at all cause another to slay. – In both the places, denial is meant, since no question can have been asked.”

The reason f for the denial of slaying applying to all actions alike, what the Lord means to teach in this section appears to be the denial of all action whatsoever in the case of the enlightened; the denial, however, of the specific act of slaying being only meant as an example.

(Objection): – What special reason for the absence of action in the case of an enlightened man does the Lord see when denying actions in the words „how does such a man slay?”
(Answer): – The immutability of the Self has already been given as the reason for the absence of all actions.

(Objection): – True, it has been given; but that cannot be a sufficient reason, since the enlightened man is distinct from the immutable Self. We cannot indeed say that a man who has known an immovable pillar can have no action to do.

(Answer): – This objection does not apply. For, the enlightened man is identical with the Self. Enlightenment (vidvatta) does not pertain to the aggregate of the body, etc. Therefore, as the only other alternative, the enlightened man should be identical with the Self, who is not included in the aggregate and is immutable. No action being possible in the case of an enlightened man, it is but just to deny all action in the words „how does such a man slay?”

Now, for instance, the Self, while remaining immutable, is, by reason of His not being distinguished from intellectual states (buddhi-vṛttis), imagined, through ignorance, to be the percipient of objects, such as sound, perceived by the intellect and other means.

Similarly, the Self is imagined to be enlightened, merely because of avidya associating Him with that intellectual perception – which is unreal – which takes the form of discrimination between the Self and the not-Self, while in reality the Self has undergone no change whatever.

From this assertion of impossibility of action in the case of an enlightened man, the conclusion of the Lord is evident, that those acts which are enjoined by the scripture are intended for the unenlightened.

Works are meant for the unenlightened.
(Objection): – Even knowledge is intended for the unenlightened only, as it would be useless – like grinding the flour over again – to impart knowledge to those who already possess it. Wherefore, it is hard to explain the distinction that works are meant for the unenlightened, and not for the enlightened.

(Answer): – This objection does not apply. For, the distinction can be explained by the existence or non-existence of something to be performed in the two cases respectively. (To explain): There remains something for the unenlightened man to do, on understanding the meaning of the injunctions regarding the Agnihotra &c. He thinks that the Agnihotra and other sacrificial rites are to be performed, and that the many necessary accessories thereto should be acquired. He thinks further, „I am the agent, this is my duty.” Nothing, on the contrary, remains to be performed subsequent to the realization of the truth of such teachings as are contained in 2.20 etc., regarding the, real nature of the Self. No other conviction arises except that the Self is one and non-agent. Wherefore, the distinction referred to can be accounted for.

In the case of him who thinks that the Self is the doer of actions, there will necessarily arise the idea that he has this or that thing to do. A man who possesses this sort of knowledge is qualified for actions, and on him actions are enjoined. Such a man is unenlightened, for it is said that „both these know not aright” (2.19).

In 2.21, the enlightened man is specified, and with reference to him actions are denied in the words „how does such a man slay?”

Therefore the enlightened man who has seen the immutable Self and the man who is eager for emancipation have only to renounce all works.

Hence it is that Lord Narayaṇa distinguishes the enlightened Sankhyas from the unenlightened followers of works, and teaches to them respectively two distinct paths (3.3).

Accordingly, Vyasa said to his son, „Now there are two paths.” (MBh 12.233.6). In the same connection, Vyasa said that the path of works is the first, and that renunciation comes next. Our Lord will refer to this distinction again and again in this work. (vide 3.27, 28; 5.13, &c.)

(Opponent): – Because the Self is inaccessible to any of the senses.
(Answer): – Not so. For, the Scripture says „It can be seen by the mind alone.” (Bṛh-up. 4.4.19). The mind, refined by Śama and Dama – i. e., by the subjugation of the body, the mind and the senses – and equipped with the teachings of the Scripture and the

Teacher, constitutes the sense by which the Self may be seen. Thus, while the Scripture and inference (anumāna) teach the immutability of the Self, it is mere temerity to hold that no such knowledge can arise.

The enlightened should resort to Jñāna-Yoga.
It must be granted that the knowledge which thus arises necessarily dispels ignorance, its opposite. This ignorance has been already indicated in 2.19. It is there taught that the notion that the Self is the agent or the object of the action of slaying is a product of ignorance.

That the agency, &c., of the Self is a product of ignorance holds good in the case of all actions alike, since the Self is immutable. It is only the agent, subject to variations of condition, that causes another person, who can be acted on by him, to do an action.

This agency – direct and causative with respect to all actions alike – Lord Vasudeva denies in 2.21 in the case of an enlightened man, with a view to show that the enlightened man has nothing to do with any action whatsoever.

(Question): – What, then, has he to do?
(Answer): – This has been already answered in 3.3, that the Sankhyas should resort to Jñāna-Yoga or devotion to knowledge. So also, the Lord will teach renunciation of all works in the words, „Renouncing all actions by thought, the self-controlled man rests happily in the nine-gated city, – in the body – neither acting nor causing to act” (5.13).

(Objection): – Here the word ‚thought‚ implies that there is no renunciation of the acts of speech and body.
(Answer): – No, for there is the qualification, ‚all actions.’

(Objection): – The renunciation of all mental acts only is meant.
(Answer): – No. Since all acts of speech and body are preceded by mental activity, they cannot exist when the mind is inactive.

(Objection): – Then, let him renounce all other acts of mind except such as are necessary for those acts of speech and body which are enjoined by the Scripture.
(Answer): – No, for, there is the qualification, „neither acting nor causing to act.”

(Objection): – Then, the renunciation of all actions, here taught by the Lord, may be meant for the dying man, not for the living man.
(Answer): – No; for, then, the qualification ‚rests in the nine-gated city – in the body‚ would have no meaning. No man who is dying can by giving up all activity be said to rest in the body.

(Answer): – No. Everywhere (in the śruti and in the smriti) is emphatically asserted that the Self is immutable. Moreover, the act of resting presupposes a place to rest in, whereas the act of renunciation does not presuppose it. And the Sanskrit verb ‚sam + nyas’ means ‚to renounce,’ not ‚to deposit.’